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Abstract
This paper compares patent licensing regimes in a Hotelling model where rms
are located symmetrically and not necessary at the end points of the city. I suppose
that one of the rms owns a process innovation reducing the marginal unit cost.
This patent holding rm will decide to sell a license or not to the non innovative
rm and will choose, when licensing, between a xed fee or a royalty. The key
di¤erence between this paper and other papers is that here I suppose that rms
are not static and can move along the linear city symmetrically. I nd that when
there is no licensing, Nash equilibrium exists only when innovation is non drastic.
I also nd that royalties licensing is better than xed fee licensing when innovation
is small. When the innovation is intermediate I nd that xed fee is better than a
royalty. The paper shows that a xed fee is not better than a non licensing regime
independently of the innovation size and the optimal licensing regime is royalties
when innovation is small. Finally, I show that a patent holding rm should not
license its innovation when it is intermediate or drastic.
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Introduction
Several authors studied patent licensing and transfer of innovation. Wang
(1998) and (2002) compared licensing regimes in a Cournot duopoly and then
in a di¤erentiated Cournot oligopoly and nd that optimal licensing regime
depends on the size of the innovation (drastic or non drastic 2 ). Kamien, Oren
and Tauman (1992) studied optimal licensing regime for a cost reducing in-
novation when innovative rm is outside of the market. Cohen and Morrison
(2004) focused on spillovers in the US food manufacturing industry across
states and from agricultural input supply and consumer demand and nd av-
erage and marginal cost e¤ects in the spatial and industry dimensions that
a¤ect location decisions. Mai and Peng (1999) discussed cooperation and com-
petition between rms in a Hotelling spatial model with di¤erentiation. Piga
and Theoloky (2005) supposed that R&D spillovers depend on rms location
which means that spillovers increase when rms are close the each others.
They show that distance between rms location increases with the degree of
product di¤erentiation. Osborne and Pitchik (1987) studied optimal locations
of two competing rms in a Hotellings model and nd that they choose lo-
cations close to the quartiles of the market. Paci and Usai (2000) investigate
the process of spatial agglomeration of innovation and production activities
in an econometric analysis of 85 industrial sectors and 784 Italian local labor
systems and nd that technological activities of a local industry inuence pos-
itively innovations of the same sectors in contiguous areas. Alcacer and Chung
(2007) examine rmslocation choices expecting di¤erences in rms strategies
of new entrants into the United States from 1985 to 1994 and nd that rms
favor locations with academic innovation activity. Alderighi and Piga (2009)
investigate properties of two types of cost reducing restrictions that guarantee
the existence of equilibrium in pure strategies in Bayesien spatial models with
heterogeneous rms. Poddar and Sinha (2004) studied technology transfer in
a Hotelling model where rms are located at the end points of the linear city
and nd, for an insider patentee, that royalty licensing is optimal when inno-
vation is non drastic while no licensing is the best when innovation is drastic.
Matsumura and Matsushima (2008) studied the relationship between licensing
activities and the locations of the rms. They nd that licensing activities fol-
lowing R&D investment always lead to the maximum di¤erentiation between
rms and the mitigation of price competition. Long and Sonbeyran (1998)
supposed in a Hotelling model that spillovers depend on the distance between
rms and nd that agglomeration can be optimal. They also nd that geo-
graphical dispersion in a two dimensional plane is another possible outcome.
Hussler, Lorentz and Rond (2007) supposed that, in a Hotelling model, ab-
sorptions capacities of the rms are function of their internal R&D investment
2 Arrow (1962) was the rst to introduce the analysis of the innovation drasticity.
An innovation is called drastic when the patent owner become a monopoly.
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and rms determine endogenously the maximum level of knowledge spillovers
they might absorb. They nd that knowledge spillovers are maximum if rms
are located symmetrically and tend to agglomeration in the center of the lin-
ear city when transportation cost increase. Pinkse, Slade and Brett (2002)
investigate the nature of price competition among rms producing di¤erenti-
ated products and competing in markets that are limited in extent through an
econometric study of the US wholesale gasoline markets and nd that compe-
tition is highly localized. Alderighi and Piga (2008) considered a Salop model
with heterogeneous costs and nd that cost heterogeneity increases welfare
and induce less excessive entry.
This paper studies xed fee and royalty licensing in a linear model where rms
are not necessary at the end points of the city like in Poddar and Sinha (2004)
bur are located symmetrically. The paper shows that Nash equilibrium exists
if and only if rms are located with respect to some conditions depending on
the cost reducing innovation.
1 Model
Lets suppose a linear city with a long l and two rms A and B producing
homogeneous goods and located symmetrically on the city. Lets suppose too
that rm A is located at a and rm B at l   a (a < l
2
).
A B
1longueur =
0
a a
1
x
ax - ax1 --
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To compare patent licensing regimes, I suppose that rm A owns a patented
cost reducing innovation allowing to reduce the unit marginal cost by " which
measures the size of the innovation and depends on the investment on R&D
by innovative rm. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the linear city
(interval [0; l])and each one pay a linear transport cost equal to td (t is the
transport unit cost and d the distance between the consumer and the rm).
The innovative rm will choose between two licensing regimes : a xed fee
licensing where non innovative rm must pay an amount of money not de-
pending on the quantity produced in exchange of the use of the license or
a royalty licensing where non innovative rm must pay a xed rate on each
quantity produced using the new technology. Game stages are as follows: in
the rst stage, the two rms choose their locations. In the second stage, de-
cides to license its innovation or not and the xed fee or the royalty to apply
and in the third and last stage, the two rms compete in prices. To calculate
demand functions of the two rms, we must nd the location of the marginal
consumer where its utility function when buying the product of the rm A is
equal to its utility when buying the product of the rm B: The utility of each
consumer depends negatively of the transportation cost and the price of the
product.
UA =  p1   t jx  aj and UA =  p2   t jl   x  aj
The utility function of a consumer located at x and buying the rm A product
is :
UA =
8><>: p1   t (a  x) if x < a p1   t (x  a) if x > a
The utility function of a consumer located at x and buying the rm B product
is :
UB =
8><>: p2   t (l   x  a) if x < l   a p2   t (x+ a  l) if x > l   a
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In the interval x 2 [a; l   a] , the location of the marginal consumer is ~x and
veries :UA = UB () ~x = p2 p1+tl2t
Demand function of the rm A is :
DA =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
l if p1 2 INTA1
~x if p1 2 INTA2
0 if p1 2 INTA3
() DA =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
l if p1 2 INTA1
p2 p1+tl
2t
if p1 2 INTA2
0 if p1 2 INTA3
where INTA1 = [c1; p2   t(l  2a)], INTA2 = [p2   t(l  2a); p2 + t(l  2a)] and
INTA3 = [p2 + t(l   2a);+1]
Demand function of the rm B is :
DB =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if p2 2 INTB1
l   ~x if p2 2 INTB2
l if p2 2 INTB3
() DB =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if p2 2 INTB1
p1 p2+tl
2t
if p2 2 INTB2
l if p2 2 INTB3
where INTB1 = [p1 + t(l   2a);+1], INTB2 = [p1   t(l   2a); p1 + t(l   2a)]
and INTB3 = [c2; p1   t(l   2a)]
Prots of the innovative and non innovative rms are :
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A =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(p1   c1) l if p1 2 INTA1
(p1   c1) p2 p1+tl2t if p1 2 INTA2
0 if p1 2 INTA3
B =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if p2 2 INTB1
(p2   c2) p1 p2+tl2t if p2 2 INTB2
(p2   c2) l if p2 2 INTB3
To nd a Nash equilibrium, the prices of the two rms p1 and p2 must verify
this inequality : jp1   p2j  t(l   2a). In fact, the prot of the rm A is not
positive in the interval INTA3 and to make a positive prot, rm A should
choose a price p1 verifying p1 < p2 + t(l   2a):Also, rm B realize a non
positive prot in the interval INTB1 and should choose a price p2 verifying
p2 < p1 + t(l   2a): We show nally that a Nash equilibrium exists in the
interval INTA2 (or INT
B
2 ).
Prots maximization in respect of prices gives:
8><>:
@A
@p1
= 1
2t
(p2   2p1 + tl + c1)
@2A
@p21
=  1
t
< 0
and
8><>:
@B
@p2
= 1
2t
(p1   2p2 + tl + c2)
@2B
@p22
=  1
t
< 0
We nd at the equilibrium :
8><>:
@A
@p1
= 0
@B
@p2
= 0
()
8><>: p1 =
1
2
(p2 + tl + c1)
p2 =
1
2
(p1 + tl + c2)
=)
8><>: p

1 = tl +
1
3
(2c1 + c2)
p2 = tl +
1
3
(c1 + 2c2)
The optimal prot functions of rms A and B at the equilibrium are :
A =
1
2t

tl + 1
3
(c2   c1)
2
and B =
1
2t

tl + 1
3
(c1   c2)
2
Demand functions are :
DA = ~x =
1
2t

tl + 1
3
(c2   c1)

if p1 2 INTA2
DB = l   ~x = 12t

tl   1
3
(c2   c1)

if p2 2 INTB2
6
2 No licensing
In this regime, innovative rm prot alone from its innovation while non in-
novative rm uses the old technology. Denoting by c1 and c2 marginal unit
costs of respectively rm A and rm B, we can write: c1 = c   " and c2 = c.
Replacing in rms equilibrium prots, we nd:
A =
1
2t

tl + 1
3
"
2
and B = 12t

tl   1
3
"
2
Price equilibrium are :
p1 = tl + c  23" and p2 = tl + c  13"
We can see in p1 and p

2 that the use of the new technology allows rm A
to buy its product at a price jp1   p2j = 13" lower than rm B price. this
di¤erence in prices depends on the size of innovation " which will decide if
the non innovative rm will leave or not the market. In fact, rm B using the
old technology make a non negative prot when p2 > c () " < 3tl. We can
see that equilibrium price of rm B exceeds its production unit cost c when
innovation is non drastic (" < 3tl). To have a Nash Equilibrium, we suppose
that innovation of rm A is not drastic to avoid having a monopoly on the
linear city since for "  3tl we have p2 < c and B = 0:
The prot of rm A includes three functions: an a¢ ne function on the interval
INTA1 , a parabolic function on the interval INT
A
2 and a null function on
the interval INTA3 . To have a Nash equilibrium on the interval INT
A
2 , the
maximum prot of rm A on the interval INTA2 must be higher than its
maximum prot on the interval INTA1 .
Firm A optimal prot on INTA2 is 
Int2
A =
1
2t

tl + 1
3
"
2
and the optimal prot
on INTA1 is 
Int1
A =

2at+ 2
3
"

l
A =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(p1   c1) l Si p1 2 INTA1
(p1   c1) p2 p1+tl2t Si p1 2 INTA2
0 Si p1 2 INTA3
=) A =
8>>>>><>>>>>:

2at+ 2
3
"

l Si p1 2 INTA1
1
2t

tl + 1
3
"
2
Si p1 2 INTA2
0 Si p1 2 INTA3
A Nash equilibrium exists if Int2A > 
Int1
A () a < l4 + "36t2l ("  6tl) :
Proposition 1 When there is no licensing, a Nash equilibrium exists when
innovation is non drastic and when rms are located symmetrically on the
linear city and verifying a < l
4
+ "
36t2l
("  6tl). When innovation is drastic,
the non innovative rm, using the old technology, leave the linear city.
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Lets now study the e¤ect of the innovation size on rm locations. We denote
by amax = l4 +
"
36t2l
("  6tl) the maximum distance between one rm and
the nearest end point of the city. Calculating the derivative of the maximum
location with respect to " we nd:
@amax
@"
= 1
18lt2
("  3lt) < 0 when " < 3tl
we see that, when the size of innovation increase, the maximum location de-
crease which means that rms come closer to the end points of the city.
Proposition 2 When innovative rm do not license its innovation, more the
innovation size increase more rms, placed symmetrically on the linear city,
become closer to the end points.
3 Fixed fee licensing
In this regime, rm B can use the new technology in exchange of the payment
of a xed fee denoted by F to the patent holding rm. The maximum amount
that rm A can choose is equal to the increase of rm B prot when using
the new technology. F = FB   PLB    with   ! 0 to be sure that rm B
will accept to buy the license.
Firm A and rm B production unit costs are c1 = c2 = c   ". Replacing in
the prot functions we nd : A = 12t (tl)
2 and B = 12t (tl)
2
Fixed fee amount is equal to :
F = "
6t

2tl   1
3
"

  
Total revenue of the patent holding rm is:
FA = A + F =
1
2t
(tl)2 + "
6t

2tl   1
3
"

   = 1
2t

tl + 1
3
"
2   2
9
"2

  
Proposition 3 In a Hotelling model where rms are located symmetrically
and with a patented cost-reducing innovation owned by one rm, we nd that
xed fee licensing is always lower than no licensing independently of the inno-
vation size.
PROOF. [Preuve] FA   PLA =   19t"2    < 0
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4 Royalty licensing
In the royalty regime, the cost-reducing innovation is sold to the non innovative
rm in exchange of a royalty amount depending on the production made with
the use of the new technology. The amount of royalties is proportional to the
demand of rm B and equal to r (l   ~x). Firm B will accept to buy the license
in this regime only when it will allow it to increase its no licensing prot which
means that r must be in the interval ]0; "[ unless this licensing regime will not
be important to study.
Production unit costs of rms A and B are respectively c1 = c   " and c2 =
c  "+ r. Replacing in the prot functions we nd :
A =
1
2t

tl + 1
3
r
2
and B = 12t

tl   1
3
r
2
Maximizing rm A prot with respect to r we nd :
@A
@r
= 1
9t
(r + 3lt) > 0: Since r 2]0; "[ then A is maximal when r is maximal
which means that r = "   (! 0)
The prots of the two rms are :
A =
1
2t

tl + 1
3
"
2
and B = 12t

tl   1
3
"
2
Total revenue of the patent holding rm is :
rA = A + r (l   ~x) = 12t

tl + 1
3
"
2
+ "
2t

tl   1
3
(2c+ ")

Proposition 4 Royalty licensing is better than no licensing when innovation
is small (" < 3tl   2c).
PROOF. rA   PLA = "6t (3tl   2c  ")
rA > 
PL
A if " < 3tl   2c and rA < PLA if " > 3tl   2c
Comparing rm A total revenue when licensing with a xed fee and its total
revenue when with a royalty licensing, we nd that (when ! 0) rA FA =
"
18t
(9tl   6c  "). We notice that rA > FA if " < 9tl   6c and rA < FA if
" > 9tl   6c .
Proposition 5 Royalties licensing can be better than xed fee licensing when
innovation is small or intermediate (" < 9tl   6c). However, a xed fee is
better for the patent holding rm than royalties when innovation is strong
(" > 9tl   6c).
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Optimal licensing regimes for the patent holding rm are as follows :8>>>>><>>>>>:
r  PL  F if 0 < " < 3tl   2c
PL  r  F if 3tl   2c < " < 9tl   6c
P l  F  r if " > 9tl   6c
The optimal licensing regime when " < 3tl  2c is royalties while no licensing
become better when " > 3tl   2c: However, royalty licensing is an optimal
strategy for the patent holding rm only when we have two rms on the
market. Les remember that to be in a Nash equilibrium, rm A and rm B
must choose their prices such that jp1   p2j  t(l   2a) unless one of them
make a non positive prot. So rm A will keep its price in this interval only
when it has not interest to deviate, which means that it makes a prot in this
interval greater than its prot in the other interval.
rA =
8>>>>><>>>>>:

2
3
"+ 2at

l if p1 2 INTA1
1
2t

tl + 1
3
"
2
+ "
2t

tl   1
3
(2c+ ")

if p1 2 INTA2
0 if p1 2 INTA3
rA

INTA2

> rA

INTA1

() a < l
4
  "
18t2l
("  (9tl   3c))
Proposition 6 Royalty licensing is optimal for the innovative rm when in-
novation is small (" < 3tl   2c) and when it is located in the interval [0; l
4
 
"
18t2l
("  (9tl   3c)) [ . For other locations or innovation size, no licensing be-
come the optimal licensing strategy.
5 Conclusion
We studied in this in this model optimal licensing strategies for an innovative
rm on a Hotelling linear city. We nd that the size of the innovation has an
e¤ect on rms equilibrium locations. when rms are located symmetrically,
we nd that an increase in the innovation size make rms more close to the
end points of the city. We also nd that a xed fee licensing is always lower
than no licensing regime and in this licensing, the non innovative rm leaves
the market when innovation is drastic. In a comparison between xed fee and
royalties, we nd that xed fee is better than royalties when innovation is
intermediate or strong. Finally, we show that a Nash equilibrium exists for a
royalty licensing when innovation is small and for specic rm locations. In
the other cases, the patent holding rm should benet alone of its innovation
and become a monopoly.
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